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Triggering Tinker:  
Student Speech in the Age of 
Cyberharassment 
ARI EZRA WALDMAN* 
This essay challenges the common assumption that pub-
lic schools have limited authority to regulate cyberbullying 
that originates and takes place off campus. That argument 
presumes a level of myopia, clarity, and literalism in the law 
that simply does not exist. First, even assuming it existed, a 
geographic requirement is an outdated creature of a pre-In-
ternet age. Cyberbullying poses unique challenges to young 
people, educators, and schools not contemplated when the 
Court decided its student speech cases. Second, I argue that 
a campus presence requirement for regulating any kind of 
off-campus cyberspeech never really existed, so any sugges-
tion to the contrary offers false clarity based entirely on 
dicta or assumptions. And third, to the extent that the Court 
referred to the geographic boundaries of a school in its 
quartet of student speech cases, the justices’ words cannot 
be taken too literally. Like references to the four walls of the 
office in public employee speech cases, a campus presence 
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Technology, New York Law School; Affiliate Scholar, Princeton University Cen-
ter for Information Technology Policy. Ph.D., Columbia University; J.D., Harvard 
Law School. Part of this essay is adapted from my articles, Hostile Educational 
Environments, 71 MARYLAND L. REV. 705 (2012), and Tormented: Anti-Gay Bul-
lying in Schools, 85 TEMPLE L. REV. 385 (2012). In this essay, I take my argument 
in new directions, as my thinking on the subject of off-campus cyberspeech has 
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requirement is just a proxy for or a paradigmatic example of 
applying a broader, more flexible standard focused on rela-
tionships: between the victim and her harasser and between 
them and the school. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We are often told that public schools have limited authority to 
regulate student-to-student cyberharassment, commonly known as 
cyberbullying, when it originates and takes place off campus.1         
The assumption is prevalent in cyberbullying policies2 and in legal 
                                                                                                             
 1 See, e.g., Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools Into the Fray, NEW 
YORK TIMES (June 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/style/28bully.
html (“fewer than half [of the states that had enacted anti-bullying laws] offer 
guidance about whether schools may intervene in bullying involving ‘electronic 
communication,’ which almost always occurs outside of school . . . .”). 
 2 See, e.g., SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF DETROIT, MICHIGAN, Order 
Adopting the Detroit Public Schools Anti-Bullying Policy, 2012-EMRR-22 (June 
6, 2012), available at http://detroitk12.org/content/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/
Order-2012-EMRR-22.pdf (“This policy also pertains to usage of electronic tech-
nology and electronic communication that is used for bullying, or cyber-bullying. 
Electronic technology and electronic communication that is used for bullying or 
cyber-bullying which occurs outside of school, school property, school-sponsored 
functions and activities, and school-related transportation is not within the scope 
of the individual school or school District’s responsibility, provided, however, if 
the telecommunications device or service is owned by or under the control of Dis-
trict, the policy applies.”). 
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guidance from advocacy organizations.3 This idea was also floated 
by at least one former Supreme Court justice.4 Beyond the “school-
house gate,”5 the argument goes, students enjoy all the free speech 
rights entitled to ordinary citizens. And short of making a true threat6 
or engaging in any of the few other activities unprotected by the First 
Amendment,7 students are generally safe from their public schools 
reaching their regulatory arms into the web. 
That argument presumes a level of myopia, clarity, and literal-
ism in the law that simply does not exist. First, even assuming it 
                                                                                                             
 3 The ACLU of Washington State, for example, states “[g]enerally, your 
school cannot censor or discipline you for posting content or sending a message 
that is: sent during non-school hours; and sent using an off-campus Internet con-
nection; and sent using a non-school computer; and sent using a non-school e-
mail address.” Student Rights and Responsibilities in the Digital Age: A Guide for 
Public School Students in Washington State, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
WASH. STATE (Jan. 2012), https://aclu-wa.org/student-rights-and-responsibilities
-digital-age-guide-public-school-students-washington-state#ID. 
 4 During the question and answer session after former Supreme Court Justice 
John Paul Stevens delivered his keynote address at the University of Miami 
School of Law’s Symposium, “The Constitution on Campus,” the Author asked 
the Justice if the Court’s student speech jurisprudence would permit public 
schools to regulate off-campus cyberbullying that targeted students. Justice Ste-
vens suggested that he would be inclined to find that schools had no authority if 
the speech took place off campus. Post-Speech Question and Answer Session with 
Justice John Paul Stevens (Ret.), United States Supreme Court, in Coral Gables, 
Fla. (Feb. 5, 2016). 
 5 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) 
(“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. This has been 
the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50 years.”). 
 6 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969) (holding that a 
“true threat” is not protected by the First Amendment); Wisniewski v. Bd. of 
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating that schools have broader authority 
over student speech than allowed by the “true threats” standard in Watts). See also 
Lovell ex rel. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“In light of the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified 
in taking very seriously student threats against faculty or other students.”). 
 7 Among other activities, the First Amendment does not protect obscenity, 
“fighting words,” child pornography, incitement, “true threats,” solicitation to 
commit criminal acts, or defamation/libel/slander. See Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476, 481 (1957); Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); 
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 
444, 447 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951); Konigs-
berg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49–50 n.10 (1961). 
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existed, a geographic requirement is an outdated creature of a pre-
Internet age. Cyberbullying poses unique challenges to young peo-
ple, educators, and schools not contemplated when the Supreme 
Court decided its student speech cases.8 Second, I argue that a cam-
pus presence requirement for regulating any kind of off-campus 
cyber-speech never existed. And third, to the extent that the Su-
preme Court referred to the four walls of the school in its quartet of 
student speech cases,9 the justices’ words cannot be taken too liter-
ally. Like similar references in public employee speech cases,10 any 
mention of a school’s campus are just paradigmatic examples for 
applying a broader, more flexible standard focused on relationships 
among the victim, the harasser, and the school. This essay argues 
that the Tinker standard11 for evaluating student speech is triggered 
not by the presence of that speech on campus, but by the speaker’s 
actions as student qua student and his connections to the school en-
vironment. 
To be clear, this thesis focuses on Tinker’s trigger, or when a 
court moves student speech from standard First Amendment doc-
trine to the more limited freedom of Tinker and its progeny.12 Ap-
plying that standard to specific speech is a question for another day. 
What’s more, eradicating cyberbullying will take a comprehensive 
approach from policymakers, educators, psychologists, parents, and 
                                                                                                             
 8 The four student speech cases are Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 
(1986); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); & Morse v. 
Frederick, 551 U.S 393 (2007). Between 2008 and 2012, petitions for certiorari 
on five cyber-speech cases were denied by the Supreme Court. Judge Thomas A. 
Jacobs (Ret.), Will the Supreme Court Consider Cyber-Bullying?, THOMSON 
REUTERS LEGAL SOL. BLOG (May 7, 2014), http://blog.legalsolutions.thomson-
reuters.com/government/will-supreme-court-consider-cyberbullying/. 
 9 See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Hazelwood, 
484 U.S. at 260; Morse, 551 U.S at 393. 
 10 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420–21 (2006). 
 11 See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 12 The Tinker standard is triggered when a student’s speech or other conduct 
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others.” Id. at 513. Additionally, “the Tinker line of cases focus on 
whether or not material disruptions have occurred or whether or not they are rea-
sonably likely to occur.” Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 
2d 965, 974 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
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lawyers. Punishments alone will not achieve much.13 But schools 
have a compelling interest in having the flexibility to punish cyber-
bullies for at least three reasons. First, cyberbullying can devastate 
its victims, most of whom are already marginalized in society.14 If 
unaddressed, cyberbullying will stunt its victims’ educational and 
professional achievement.15 Second, as a gendered and sexualized 
phenomenon,16 cyberharassment is anathematic to the core demo-
cratic principles of equality. Finally, letting cyberbullying go unpun-
ished out of a misguided desire to protect free speech actually si-
lences students,17 thus offending the very norms inaction is sup-
posed to protect. 
This essay proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly defines cyber-
bullying and distinguishes it from other forms of cyberspeech. Part 
II lays out the argument for a geographic campus presence require-
ment and shows how lower courts have applied it to the detriment 
of victims. Part III challenges this assumption on three grounds. I 
use the text of the Supreme Court’s four student speech cases—
                                                                                                             
 13 See Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize 
Cyberbullying, 77 MO. L. REV. 693, 697 (2012) (discussing how overbroad defi-
nitions in state bullying criminalization statutes leads to pernicious conse-
quences); see also Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 
84 TEMPLE L. REV. 385, 387 (2012) [hereinafter Waldman, Tormented] (arguing 
that pre-emptive, affirmative steps that improve school climate and provide sup-
port to marginalized students are likely to be more effective at stopping bullying 
than ever more draconian punishments). 
 14 Recognizing a Cyberbully, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Nov. 15, 2011), 
https://www.nsf.gov/discoveries/disc_summ.jsp?cntn_id=122271 (“Anyone who 
is in a marginalized group is more likely to be cyberbullied.” (quoting Faye 
Mishna, University of Toronto)). 
 15 Stuart Wolpert, Victims of Bullying Suffer Academically as Well, UCLA 
Psychologists Report, UCLA NEWSROOM (Aug. 19, 2010), http://newsroom.ucla.
edu/releases/victims-of-bullying-suffer-academically-168220. 
 16 See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATES CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 13 (2014) 
(“Cyber harassment disproportionately impacts women.”) [hereinafter CITRON, 
HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE]; see also Mary Anne Franks, Sexual Harassment 
2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655, 657, 682 (2012) (“[T]argeted sexual harassment of 
women in cyberspace may not only produce all of the effects that ‘real-life’ har-
assment does, but also has the potential to be even more pernicious and long-
lasting than ‘real-life’ harassment.”). 
 17 Stephanie Pappas, Why Bully Victims Suffer in Silence, LIVESCIENCE (Nov. 
17, 2010, 7:37 AM), http://www.livescience.com/8994-bully-victims-suffer-si-
lence.html. 
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Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District,18 Bethel School 
District No. 403 v. Fraser,19 Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier,20 and Morse v. Frederick21—to demonstrate that the re-
quirement stands on shaky dicta. I then argue that the Court, as it 
does in federal employee speech cases, uses geographic boundaries 
as proxies for a relational nexus between the school and its students. 
Finally, Part IV argues that, given the authority to regulate cyber-
bullying, schools have a compelling interest to do so and would, in 
fact, enhance and protect free speech. 
I. DEFINING “CYBERBULLYING” 
Definitions are important. There are a host of definitions of 
“cyberharassment” or “cyberbullying” milling around.22 Imprecise 
and inconsistent definitions frustrate our ability to understand, talk 
about, and solve the problem.23 Danielle Keats Citron, the leading 
cyberhate and harassment scholar, defines cyberharassment gener-
ally as repeated online expression that intentionally targets a partic-
ular person and causes the targeted individual substantial               
emotional distress and/or the fear of bodily harm.24 There are five 
                                                                                                             
 18 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 19 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 20 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 21 551 U.S 393 (2007). 
 22 The National Conference of State Legislatures, for example, defines cyber-
bullying as “the willful and repeated use of cell phones, computers, and other 
electronic communication devices to harass and threaten others.” Cyberbullying, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/education/cyberbullying.aspx. The Centers for Disease Control defines 
bullying as “any unwanted aggressive behavior(s) by another youth or group of 
youths, who are not siblings or current dating partners, involving an observed or 
perceived power imbalance and is repeated multiple times or is highly likely to be 
repeated.” Featured Topic: Bullying Research, CTR.’S FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/bully-
ingresearch/. 
 23 See Amanda Hess, On the Internet, Men Are Called Names. Women Are 
Stalked and Sexually Harassed, SLATE (Oct. 22, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://www.
slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/10/22/pew_online_harassment_study_men_are_
called_names_women_are_stalked_and_sexually.html. 
 24 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 16, at 3; see also Dan-
ielle Citron, Defining Online Harassment, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2014, 11:07 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/daniellecitron/2014/10/23/defining-online-harassm
ent/#1d8b0f944360. 
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core elements to that definition: repetition, use of digital technology, 
intent, targeting, and substantiality of harm.25 
Cyberbullying is a subcategory of cyberharassment that includes 
all five of those elements but is focused squarely on youth-to-youth 
behavior.26 It can be understood as repeated online expression that 
is intended to cause substantial harm by one youth or group of 
youths targeting another with an observed or perceived power im-
balance.27 The asymmetry of power, which could be physical (i.e., 
an athlete attacking a non-athlete), psychological (i.e., a popular stu-
dent attacking someone with low self-esteem), or based on identity 
(i.e., a member of the majority attacking a member of a traditionally 
marginalized and discriminated minority), draws the line between 
schoolyard teasing and bullying.28 It should come as no surprise, 
then, that young members of the LGBTQ community are uniquely 
susceptible to bullying and its tragic consequences.29 They are bul-
lied because they deviate from the norm30 and “because anti-gay 
                                                                                                             
 25 Citron, Defining Online Harassment, supra note 24. 
 26 JONATHAN CLOUGH, PRINCIPLES OF CYBERCRIME 427 (2d ed. 2015) (“As a 
sub-category of online harassment, cyberbullying is a multifaceted and challeng-
ing problem to address.”); see also Jason Koebler, Cyber Bullying Growing More 
Malicious, Experts Say, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 3, 2011, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/high-school-notes/2011/06/03/cyber-
bullying-growing-more-malicious-experts-say (cyberlaw expert Parry Aftab de-
fines cyberbullying as between minors). 
 27 The definition brings together several similar definitions into one clear 
statement. See, e.g., DAN OLWEUS, AGGRESSION IN THE SCHOOLS: BULLIES AND 
WHIPPING BOYS 3–6 (1978); Tonja R. Nansel et al., Bullying Behaviors Among 
US Youth: Prevalence and Association with Psychosocial Adjustment, 285 JAMA 
2094, 2094 (2001). 
 28 See Waldman, Tormented, supra note 13, at 389–91 (quoting Nansel, supra 
note 27, at 2094); see KEN RIGBY, BULLYING IN SCHOOLS: AND WHAT TO DO 
ABOUT IT 19, 26 (Elisa Webb ed., rev. ed. 2007) (“[A]n imbalance of power is an 
essential element in any sensible definition of bullying . . . Wherever there is a 
power imbalance, whatever its source, an individual can be reduced in status, and 
sometimes humiliated by the insensitive bully.”); see also Marilyn Langevin, 
Teasing and Bullying: Helping children deal with teasing and bullying: for par-
ents, teachers, and other adults, INST. FOR STUTTERING TREATMENT & RES., 
http://www.isastutter.org/CDRomProject/teasing/tease_bully.html (last visited 
June 9, 2016) (stating that a key element of bullying is a power imbalance). 
 29 Waldman, Tormented, supra note 13, at 391. 
 30 See, e.g., Anthony R. D’Augelli et al., Childhood Gender Atypicality, Vic-
timization, and PTSD Among Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Youth, 21 J. 
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bullying is either tacitly or explicitly condoned by anti-gay bigotry 
in society at large.”31 
This definition of cyberbullying captures the worst online ag-
gressive behavior while excluding the otherwise mean, hateful, and 
distasteful speech that free speech norms tend to tolerate.32 Cyber-
bullying is, at bottom, cyberharassment involving youth.33 And it is 
an epidemic affecting our schools.34 
II. THE CAMPUS PRESENCE ARGUMENT 
One barrier to taking cyberbullying more seriously is an inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases that sees          
the geographic boundaries of the school as the limit of the school’s 
authority.35 The argument has an air of credibility: it relies on intui-
tion and the plain language of the Court’s opinions. It also has been 
                                                                                                             
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1462, 1477–80 (2006) (“The impact of these early ex-
periences of difference, labeling, criticism by others, and victimization can be 
seen in the current mental health findings, especially trauma symptoms.”). 
 31 Waldman, Tormented, supra note 13, at 391. 
 32 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (not-
ing “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehe-
ment, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks . . . .”); see also Richard 
Wike, Americans More Tolerant of Offensive Speech than Others in the World, 
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2016/10/12/americans-more-tolerant-of-offensive-speech-than-others-in-the-
world/ (“Americans are much more tolerant of offensive speech than people in 
other nations. For instance, 77% in the U.S. support the right of others to make 
statements that are offensive to their own religious beliefs . . . 67% think people 
should be allowed to make public statements that are offensive to minority 
groups . . . [and] at least half endorse the right to sexually explicit speech. Amer-
icans don’t necessarily like offensive speech more than others, but they are much 
less inclined to outlaw it.”). 
 33 See supra note 26. 
 34 See, e.g., Joseph G. Kosciw et al., The 2009 National School Climate Sur-
vey: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth in Our 
Nation’s Schools, GAY, LESBIAN, & STRAIGHT EDUC. NETWORK 28 (2010) (In a 
survey of students in schools in all fifty states and the District of Columbia, more 
than half of gay, lesbian, and bisexual students reported being harassed through 
electronic mediums, and almost a fifth had experienced it frequently). 
 35 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393 (2007). 
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hammered home by lower courts.36 In this section, I briefly summa-
rize the argument for a campus presence requirement and show how 
it has been adopted and spread throughout the judiciary. 
The conventional wisdom states that the Court introduced the 
on-campus/off-campus distinction in Tinker v. Des Moines.37 The 
decision’s most famous line—“[i]t can hardly be argued that either 
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate”38—refers to a geo-
graphic boundary. Indeed, the entirety of Tinker’s world—the black 
arm band protest itself and Justice Fortas’ discussion of student 
rights versus school authority—appears, on first glance, to exist only 
inside school grounds.39 The evidence of this is manifold. The stu-
dents wore their black armbands to school on two different days.40 
To argue that students retain some speech rights at school, Justice 
Fortas turned to West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 
where the Court upheld a student’s right to refuse to salute the flag 
while in school.41 These student rights were balanced against the 
authority of states and school officials to “prescribe and control con-
duct in the schools.”42 Furthermore, when Justice Fortas referred to 
the disruptive potential of student speech, he limited its                       
universe to speech that took place “in class, in the lunchroom, or on 
the campus.”43 The prospect of having to consider a school’s author-
ity over off-campus speech never occurred to him. 
A similar theme repeats in Justice White’s opinion in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier.44 Schools could regulate some student 
                                                                                                             
 36 See infra notes 48–52 (explaining the holdings of 
LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001); Boucher v. Sch. Bd., 
134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); 
Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998); & 
Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000)). 
 37 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 38 Id. at 506 (emphasis added). 
 39 See generally id. at 512–14. 
 40 Id. at 504. 
 41 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; see generally W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 42 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added). 
 43 Id. at 508; see also id. at 512–13 (“When [the student] is in the cafeteria, 
or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may 
express his opinions . . . .”). 
 44 See generally Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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speech, the Court stated, “even though the government could not 
censor similar speech outside the school.”45 Nor was the student 
newspaper at issue in Hazelwood a public forum like a street or a 
park; rather, it was part of the “school facilities” that served the mis-
sion of educating students.46 
Accordingly, throughout the Supreme Court’s student speech ju-
risprudence, the speech always took place inside school grounds or 
closely connected to school activities.47 This created the impression 
that the Tinker standard can only be triggered by a campus presence 
requirement. 
Lower federal courts agree. Indeed, almost every lower court 
that has had occasion to take up the issue has required off-campus 
speech to have some connection to the geographic boundaries of the 
school before the Tinker standard can be applied. Some courts re-
quire that the speaker bring the speech through the gates himself48 
or at least know that it would be distributed within the boundaries 
of the school.49 Others require reasonable foreseeability that the 
speech would breach campus walls.50 Still, others require that such 
speech at least be seen or heard on campus.51 But there is consensus 
                                                                                                             
 45 Id. at 266 (emphasis added). 
 46 Id. at 267. 
 47 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (where students showed 
a banner stating “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” at a school-sponsored, but off-campus, 
viewing of the Olympic torch relay). 
 48 See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001) (up-
holding the suspension of a student who wrote a poem describing a school shoot-
ing because the student brought the poem inside the boundaries of campus, thus 
triggering Tinker). 
 49 See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821, 
822 (7th Cir. 1998) (where Tinker was triggered because the student speech, an 
article published off-campus explaining “how to hack the school[‘]s gay ass com-
puters,” was distributed on school grounds in the bathrooms, lockers, and in the 
cafeteria). 
 50 See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (applying 
Tinker to off-campus speech calling school officials “douchebags” only because 
it was “reasonably foreseeable” that the speech would make its way on to cam-
pus). 
 51 See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 
1177– 78, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (applying Tinker to a website created by a stu-
dent off-campus only when another student accessed the website at school and 
showed it to a teacher, bringing it within the geographic boundaries of the school). 
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under this divergence: in all cases, whether they uphold a punish-
ment or reject it,52 lower federal courts have interpreted the language 
of the Supreme Court’s rulings literally and required that off-cam-
pus speech come on to campus before it could be subject to a 
school’s regulatory authority.53 As the Second Circuit stated, “our 
willingness to defer to the schoolmaster’s expertise in administering 
school discipline rests, in large measure, upon the supposition that 
the arm of authority does not reach beyond the schoolhouse gate.”54 
Given the universality of the campus presence doctrine in the courts, 
it is no wonder it has bled so deeply into our collective conscience. 
III. A RELATIONAL NEXUS 
Even if we assume that the Supreme Court did intend, in its quar-
tet of student speech cases,55 to create a campus presence require-
ment, such a trigger for Tinker is woefully outdated in the digital 
age. More importantly, a close reading of the Court’s decisions 
shows that a strict, geographic campus presence trigger never ex-
isted. Rather, the Court makes clear that its references to gates,56 
boundaries,57 and school activities58 are proxies for a more flexible 
relational standard for regulating student speech. This standard, 
when applied to cyberbullying cases, would give schools the flexi-
bility to restrict cyberbullying that affects the school environment 
while protecting students’ dissident speech on matters of truly pub-
lic concern.  
 
                                                                                                             
 52 See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–
90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (refusing to apply Tinker because the speech at issue, a 
website that included mock obituaries of school personnel and allowed visitors to 
vote on who should “die,” was created entirely off-campus). 
 53 See generally supra notes 48–52. 
 54 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044–
45 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 55 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393 (2007). 
 56 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 57 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. 
 58 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
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A.  An Outdated Trigger 
Requiring student speech to take place on campus before school 
officials could censor, regulate, or punish it may have made sense in 
1969 when Tinker was decided. It is hard to imagine how off-cam-
pus speech in a pre-Internet age could substantially disrupt the 
school. Things are different now. 
Internet and digital technologies are everywhere. We use            
them to socialize59 and date,60 buy coffee,61 and watch movies.62 The 
Internet is in our homes and in our clothes;63 it links up our home 
appliances and even our stuffed animals.64 Though we may be 
speeding ahead without thinking things through,65 the fact remains 
                                                                                                             
 59 According to its most recent statistics, Facebook has over 1.79 billion 
monthly active users, which is an approximately 8.5% year-over-year increase. 
Stats, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 27, 2017). 
 60 Pew Research Center has found that approximately 15% of American 
adults have used online dating websites or mobile dating apps, up from 11% who 
reported doing so in 2013. The share of 18–24 year olds who report using online 
dating apps tripled between 2013 and 2015. The number of 55–64 year olds using 
similar platforms doubled over the same period. AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH 
CTR., 15% OF AMERICAN ADULTS HAVE USED ONLINE DATING SITES OR MOBILE 
DATING APPS 2–3 (2016), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2016/02/
PI_2016.02.11_Online-Dating_FINAL.pdf. 
 61 See Molly McHugh, How to Buy Starbucks Coffee with Your iPhone, 
DIGITAL TRENDS (Jan. 19, 2012, 3:07 PM), http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile
/how-to-buy-starbucks-coffee-with-your-iphone/. 
 62 See, e.g., Ben Popper, Netflix Passes 81 Million Subscribers, but Predicts 
Slower Growth Ahead, THE VERGE (Apr. 18, 2016, 4:28 PM), http://www.thev-
erge.com/2016/4/18/11454362/netflix-q1-2016-earnings-81-million-subscribers. 
 63 See Michael Sawh, Sweat Detecting Wearable can Tell You when You’re 
Tired or Dehydrated, WAREABLE (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www.warea-
ble.com/wearable-tech/sweat-detecting-wearable-can-identify-health-issues-be-
fore-they-happen-2239. 
 64 See Leo Kelion, Google Patents ‘Creepy’ Internet Toys to Run the Home, 
BBC (May 22, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-32843518. 
 65 See Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Internet of Heirlooms and 
Disposable Things, 17 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 581, 583 (2016) (“The problem is that 
we are not taking the decision to wire up an artifact to the Internet seriously 
enough. A chip-centric mentality has taken over—one that is guided by an overly 
simplistic principle: ‘Internet connectivity makes good objects great.’ Guided by 
this upgrade mentality, we seem to be in a rush to connect everything. Meanwhile 
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that Internet and digital technologies are pervasive, particularly 
among young people. Cell phone owners between the ages of 18 and 
24 send more than 109 text messages per day, on average.66 And in 
2015, 90% of young adults surveyed reported using social media 
platforms.67 Both text messages and social media are home to ram-
pant cyberbullying.68 
In part because the Internet has come to pervade our daily lives, 
it has taken on an increasingly salient role in education. Teachers 
are integrating mobile technology, Internet tools, and social media 
into classrooms.69 There are countless websites dedicated to helping 
them.70 And public-private partnerships are working to provide 
computers and Internet access to public schools.71 All of these pro-
grams encourage both the integration of the Internet into the class-
room and its use as an educational tool at home. Therefore, the 
“school environment,” to use Justice Fortas’ term in Tinker,72 is no 
longer defined by the four walls of the classroom. It now extends as 
                                                                                                             
seemingly none of us, including policy makers and regulators, have fully appre-
ciated the significance of companies transforming from artifact and device ‘mak-
ers’ to ‘service providers.’”). 
 66 See AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICANS AND TEXT 
MESSAGING 2 (2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports
/2011/Americans%20and%20Text%20Messaging.pdf. 
 67 See ANDREW PERRIN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SOCIAL MEDIA USAGE: 2005–
2015 4 (2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/10/PI_2015-10-08_Social-
Networking-Usage-2005-2015_FINAL.pdf. 
 68 AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS, KINDNESS AND 
CRUELTY ON SOCIAL NETWORK SITES 38 (2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/
media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Teens_Kindness_Cruelty_SNS_Report_Nov_
2011_FINAL_110711.pdf. 
 69 See, e.g., Courtney Blackwell, Teacher Practices with Mobile Technology 
Integrating Tablet Computers into the Early Childhood Classroom, 7 J. EDUC. 
RES. 1, 3 (2015); Paige Abe & Nickolas A. Jordan, Integrating Social Media Into 
the Classroom Curriculum, 18 ABOUT CAMPUS 16, 16 (2013). 
 70 See, e.g., Teach with Technology: Everything You Need, SCHOLASTIC (June 
11, 2016), http://www.scholastic.com/teachers/unit/teach-technology-everything
-you-need. 
 71 See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, White 
House to Launch “Digital Promise” Initiative (Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/white-house-launch-dig
ital-promise-initiative (discussing initiative funded by the Department of Educa-
tion, Carnegie Corporation, and William and Flora Hewlett Foundation to in-
crease access to technology in schools). 
 72 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506. (1969). 
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far as the Internet tools it deploys to teach students how to add and 
subtract, read and write, think and grow. 
This is not a radical argument. Mary Anne Franks has argued 
that since our pervasive online presence allows “sexual harassment 
in one setting [to] produce harms in another,”73 sexual harassment 
law that traditionally protected victimized women in “single, pro-
tected settings” like the workplace under Title VII, the school under 
Title IX, and, to some extent, at home and in prison, inadequately 
captures what modern sex harassment looks like.74 Franks argues 
persuasively for a multiple-setting conception of sexual harassment 
because cyberharassment that takes place offsite can have just as 
deleterious an effect on a victim’s ability to function in the work-
place as traditional forms of workplace harassment.75 This is true of 
any kind of cyberharassment. Whether a student uses his or his vic-
tim’s Facebook page to make derogatory comments questioning the 
victim’s sexuality, or uses Instagram to post altered graphic photos 
depicting the victim in compromising situations, or takes to Twitter 
to engage in racist, homophobic, and xenophobic harassment, these 
attacks can cause students to fear further humiliation, lose interest 
in attending school, and close themselves off from a world they find 
increasingly hostile.76 Students become unable to learn and unable 
to participate in extracurricular activities or school society.77 Their 
educational rights are denied when there is no remedy for cyberbul-
lying that negatively affects their day-to-day lives in school, regard-
less of where their victimization occurred. 
B. What the Supreme Court Didn’t Say 
A physical on-campus presence requirement is, therefore, anti-
quated and dangerous in a highly connected and networked world. 
                                                                                                             
 73 Franks, supra note 16, at 657. 
 74 Id. at 659. 
 75 Id. (arguing that “sexual harassment in cyberspace produces harm that is 
equal to or more severe than sexual harassment that occurs in traditional protected 
spaces . . . .”). 
 76 See Wolpert, supra note 15 (“Students who get bullied run the risk of not 
coming to school, not liking school, [and] perceiving school more negatively . . . 
Children who are embarrassed or humiliated about being bullied in school are 
unlikely to discuss it with their parents or teachers . . . [and] are more likely to 
suffer in silence and dislike school.”). 
 77 See id. 
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However, it is not entirely clear a campus presence trigger ever ex-
isted. The Supreme Court has never held that student speech must 
be within the geographic boundaries of the campus to be subject to 
school punishment.78 There was never any need to. Three of its stu-
dent speech cases involved speech that was on campus;79 the fourth 
was across the street.80 Therefore, although its jurisprudence is lit-
tered with references to the school campus, it would be wrong to 
read into them a geographic trigger for the Tinker test. 
In Tinker, the Court held that a school may regulate a student’s 
expressive conduct if it causes or is reasonably likely to cause a “ma-
terial[] and substantial[]” disruption to school activities.81 The stu-
dent antiwar black arm band protest did not meet that threshold be-
cause it was “silent,” “passive,” and caused no disruption.82 Nothing 
in that standard requires that the student speech at issue be located 
within the geographic boundaries of campus.83 That issue was left 
open by Tinker: the protest took place on campus, so there was no 
geographical question to resolve. 
                                                                                                             
 78 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S 393 (2007). 
 79 See generally Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Hazelwood, 
484 U.S. at 260. 
 80 See Morse, 551 U.S at 393. 
 81 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. The Court really listed two triggers: material dis-
ruption to classwork and substantial disorder are usually combined into one. The 
second trigger is when student speech “inva[des] of the rights of others.” Id. This 
essay excludes that prong from its analysis because it has rarely been applied by 
lower courts. See Nixon v. N. Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 383 F. Supp. 2d 965, 
974 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (“[T]he Court is not aware of a single decision that has 
focused on [the ‘rights of others’ prong] in Tinker as the sole basis for upholding 
a school’s regulation of student speech . . . the Tinker line of cases focus on 
whether or not material disruptions have occurred or whether or not they are rea-
sonably likely to occur.”). That changed when the Ninth Circuit decided Harper 
v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). In that case, the court 
held that a school could order removal of a student’s T-shirt that read, among 
other things, “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 1:27’” because the 
message impinged on the rights of minority students to be free of attacks to “core 
identifying characteristic[s]” of a marginalized group. Id. at 1171, 1182. Setting 
aside Harper, however, the “rights of others” prong is rarely invoked. 
 82 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
 83 See id. 
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The Court’s trilogy of student speech cases after Tinker retained 
this pattern: a campus presence question was never an issue to be 
decided.84 They also went further, using language that made geog-
raphy seem irrelevant.85 In Fraser, the Court carved out an excep-
tion to Tinker’s substantial disruption standard for lewd and offen-
sive speech.86 That is, a graphic sexual speech by a student could be 
regulated even absent any real disruption to the school.87 The basis 
for the Court’s holding was not where the speech took place, but 
rather the inconsistency between the speech and the school’s educa-
tional mission.88 That is, while Fraser could have given his speech 
free of government interference outside the context of the “school 
environment,”89 a phrase borrowed from Tinker,90 the Court held 
that where a student engages in lewd, vulgar, or offensive speech, 
the school may regulate such speech as part of its duty to teach “es-
sential lessons of civil, mature conduct.”91 Fraser happened to de-
liver his speech on campus, but the language of the majority and 
concurring opinions reflect the Court’s ambivalence toward a strict 
campus presence requirement.92 The words “campus” or “grounds” 
never appear in the decision.93 Instead, Chief Justice Burger re-
placed it with “public school education,”94 a phrase that encom-
passes more than the boundaries of a school’s property. 
In Hazelwood, the Court upheld a principal’s decision to remove 
two articles on teen pregnancy and divorce from the school’s news-
paper.95 Distinguishing Tinker, the Court states that the two cases 
                                                                                                             
 84 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 675; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260; Morse, 551 U.S 
at 393. 
 85 See generally id. 
 86 See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684–85. 
 87 Id. at 685. (“The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials 
from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s 
would undermine the school’s basic educational mission. A high school assembly 
or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue directed towards an 
unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 90 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 91 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
 92 See, e.g., id. at 685; id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 93 See generally id. 
 94 Id. at 683. 
 95 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272–73 (1988). 
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posed different issues: Tinker asked whether a school had to tolerate 
speech it did not like; Hazelwood addressed whether the school must 
affirmatively promote student speech that ran counter to its educa-
tional mission.96 After all, the newspaper was part of a journalism 
class and bore the school’s emblem.97 In such circumstances, teach-
ers can exercise control over speech that could be interpreted as en-
dorsed by the school.98 Therefore, the Hazelwood exception for 
school-sponsored speech has no more of a campus presence require-
ment than Tinker or Fraser. The issue was not ripe to be decided, as 
the newspaper was an in-class activity.99 But even if students 
worked on their articles at home and after school, and even if the 
paper was distributed off campus, it would still have the school’s 
emblem and imprimatur.100 References to the geographic boundaries 
of the school are also absent.101 
The final case in the quartet is Morse v. Frederick.102 In that 
case, a student attended a school-sponsored viewing of the Olympic 
Torch Relay as it passed on the street in front of his high school and 
held a sign that the principal believed promoted the use of mari-
juana.103 The Court upheld the school’s suspension of Frederick not 
because of where he stood when he expressed his opinions—which 
was technically, though just barely, off campus—but because the 
school was entitled to make the decision that promoting illegal drug 
use was anathematic to its educational mission.104 
In Morse and in the other cases, the Court never had the occasion 
to hand down a definitive holding on whether a school’s regulatory 
authority over student speech requires that the speech exist within 
the boundaries of the school. The issue never came up. To suggest 
that Tinker and its progeny could never be applied to off-campus 
speech transmogrifies a fact of these particular cases into an essen-
tial element of their holdings. 
                                                                                                             
 96 Id. at 270–71. 
 97 See id. at 268. 
 98 Id. at 271. 
 99 Id. at 268. 
 100 See id. at 262. 
 101 See generally id. 
 102 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
 103 Id. at 397–98. The sign read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS,” (whatever that 
means). Id. at 397. 
 104 Id. at 409–10. 
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C. Students Acting Qua Students 
If the Supreme Court never had occasion to adopt a campus pres-
ence requirement, what are we to make of the myriad references in 
its opinions to schoolhouse gates,105 classrooms,106 lunchrooms,107 
and other physical places in the school?108 Not much. A close read-
ing of these cases suggests that the Supreme Court is not speaking 
literally. There is no physical gate delineating the boundaries of stu-
dent speech; there is no geographic nexus. Rather, the Court has al-
ways employed a relational nexus for applying Tinker, where phys-
ical presence is just one among many ways to show that a student 
was acting qua student—or, in her capacity or status as a member of 
the school community—when she spoke. This interpretation of the 
law makes sense for two reasons. First, both the Court’s language 
and substance supports it. The Court follows almost every reference 
to physical locations on campus with a reminder that the campus is 
just a symbol of, or stands in for, the educational mission.109 Second, 
the Court employs a relational nexus in other, similar circumstances, 
particularly to determine when the limited free speech rights of pub-
lic employees are triggered.110 Like a government worker engaging 
in speech in her capacity as a federal employee,111 students acting 
qua students are subject to state regulatory authority.112 
1. WHAT THE SUPREME COURT DID SAY 
Students are “‘persons’ under our Constitution” in and out of 
school,113 but it is not the boundary of the school campus that de-
limits the extent of their rights. Rather, it is the “school environ-
ment”114 that plays that role. In its student speech jurisprudence, the 
Court defined a school by its mission—to teach and educate minors 
                                                                                                             
 105 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
 106 See, e.g., id. at 512; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683. 
 107 See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688–89; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266. 
 110 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 574 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). 
 111 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
 112 See, e.g., Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
 113 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. 
 114 Id. at 506. 
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in the ways of civil society.115 That mission may extend beyond the 
physical classroom. The Court upheld a school’s disciplinary au-
thority in Morse, for example, because school officials must be em-
powered “to safeguard those entrusted to their care,” regardless of 
on which side of the campus boundary line the student held the 
sign.116 Similarly, in Fraser, where a student was suspended for 
lewd speech, Justice Brennan ignored the on-campus/off-campus 
distinction entirely, admitting that Fraser’s “speech may well have 
been protected had he given it in school but under different circum-
stances,” i.e., not at an assembly dedicated to nominating candidates 
for student council.117 It was the context in which the speech was 
given—the school teaching civic engagement through student coun-
cil activities—not the location of the speech that tipped the scales.118 
It makes sense, then, that the Court’s references to a school cam-
pus are cabined by reminders that the school’s educational relation-
ship to its students is salient. In Tinker, the Court distinguished be-
tween speech inside and outside of the “schoolhouse gate,”119 but 
analyzed the students’ free speech rights in the context of students’ 
and teachers’ liberty interest in an education that is free of govern-
ment intrusion and able to prepare the “young for citizenship.”120 
Later in the opinion, Justice Fortas seemed to return to the physical 
boundaries of the school when he stated that student rights embraced 
not only classroom hours, but also the cafeteria, the ball field, and 
any part of the “campus during the authorized hours.”121 But he had 
already reminded us that “[s]chool officials do not possess absolute 
                                                                                                             
 115 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (“The process of educating our youth for citizen-
ship in public schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics 
class; schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social order. 
Consciously or otherwise, teachers—and indeed the older students—demonstrate 
the appropriate form of civil discourse and political expression by their conduct 
and deportment in and out of class. Inescapably, like parents, they are role mod-
els.”). 
 116 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
 117 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 118 See id. 
 119 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 120 Id. at 507 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
637 (1943)). 
 121 See id. at 512–13. 
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authority over their students,” irrespective of their physical loca-
tion.122 What mattered, instead, was disruption to the educational 
mission of the school.123 Similarly, in Fraser, the Court appeared to 
suggest that the issue was what kind of speech was allowed “in the 
classroom or in school assembly,”124 but then clarified that Fraser’s 
vulgar speech could be limited not by virtue of where he spoke, but 
because a school has an interest in both protecting minors from his 
arguably lewd comments and teaching them about civic responsibil-
ity.125 A similar analysis held sway in Hazelwood. In that case, offi-
cials were permitted to act not because students created and distrib-
uted the newspaper on campus, but only because the paper was part 
of the pedagogical mission of a journalism class, bore the imprima-
tur of the school,126 and the censorship was “reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”127 The fulcrum upon which the 
merits of the First Amendment defenses were decided, therefore, 
was the relationship of the school to the student qua student. 
This is the original wisdom of Tinker. Students retain free 
speech rights up to the point that their speech substantially interferes 
with the school’s ability to fulfill its mission and educate its com-
munity.128 For student speech that occurs on campus, the fact that it 
did so is just helpful and easy proof that the educational interests of 
the school are at least implicated. The Tinker standard,129 as opposed 
                                                                                                             
 122 Id. at 511. 
 123 Id. at 513. 
 124 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (“The deter-
mination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is in-
appropriate properly rests with the school board.”). 
 125 Id. at 684–85. Compare id. at 685 (“The First Amendment does not prevent 
the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech such 
as respondent’s would undermine the school’s basic educational mission.”), with 
id. (“A high school assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit    
monologue directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.”). 
This language suggests that the important factors are the audience and the educa-
tional mission. The location is relevant to, but not determinative of, the Court’s 
analysis. 
 126 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268 (1998). 
 127 Id. 273. 
 128 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
 129 Id. at 513 (“When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the 
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on con-
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to complete free speech rights, would apply. Judges considering 
such cases can presume, much like the Supreme Court did in its stu-
dent speech cases, that on-campus speech may be subject to school 
disciplinary authority. But when student speech occurs off campus, 
its potential impact on the school’s ability to teach is not non-exis-
tent. It is just a little less obvious. These cases do not have an easy 
proxy of physical presence to meet the substantial impact test. They 
have quite a bit of other evidence, though. 
2. THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE ANALOGY 
An analogy to the limited free speech rights of government em-
ployees shows how a relational nexus would work. As we have seen, 
in cases where a student alleges that public schools have infringed 
her free speech rights, most lower courts start by asking whether the 
student’s speech took place on or off campus.130 If the latter, school 
discipline often violates the First Amendment;131 if the former, 
Tinker and its progeny apply132 and discipline may or may not be 
constitutional depending on the substantial disruption test133 and its 
exceptions for lewd,134 sponsored,135 and drug-related speech.136 In 
the public employee context, courts ask a more nuanced question: 
whether the speaker/employee was acting qua public employee at 
the time or acting in her capacity as a private “citizen [commenting] 
                                                                                                             
troversial subjects . . . if he does so without ‘materially and substantially inter-
fer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school’ and without colliding with the rights of others.”). See also supra note 12. 
 130 See supra notes 48–52 and accompanying text. 
 131 See, e.g., Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089–
90 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (refusing to apply Tinker because the speech at issue was 
created entirely off-campus). 
 132 See supra notes 48–52, briefly discussing LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 
F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001); Boucher v. Sch. Bd. of the Sch. Dist. of Greenfield, 
134 F.3d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1998); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 
2008); and Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177– 
78, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 133 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
 134 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 135 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
 136 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007). 
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on a matter of public concern.”137 If the former, she has no free 
speech claims against employer sanction; if the latter, she may have 
free speech claims if the benefits to society outweigh the harm to the 
workplace’s ability to conduct its business.138 This relational nexus, 
defined by the connection between her actions and her environment, 
could reach speech conducted entirely off campus. 
As in the student speech context, most public employee speech 
cases involve speech inside the workplace.139 But those are just the 
easiest cases, not the full extent of the doctrine. Government em-
ployees’ speech can be restricted even if it originated and took place 
beyond the four walls of the office if, when engaging in speech, the 
employees were acting in their capacity as employees. In Pickering 
v. Board of Education, for example, a public school teacher was 
fired for writing and sending a letter to the editor of a local newspa-
per criticizing educational policy decisions made by the school 
board.140 The Court nevertheless applied the balancing test because 
the speech was closely related to the teacher’s role as a teacher.141 
In City of San Diego v. Roe, in which a San Diego police officer sold 
pornographic videos of himself dressed in a generic police uni-
form,142 the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a physical workplace 
presence requirement for triggering the balancing test.143 The videos 
and related website, made entirely outside the workplace, made a 
point of connecting the officer to his career as a policeman: he wore 
a uniform, made law enforcement references, and described himself 
as “in the field of law enforcement.”144 The balancing test did not 
                                                                                                             
 137 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006). This is known as the Pick-
ering balancing test, originating in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968). 
 138 See id. at 417–18; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (1968). 
 139 See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983) (public employee 
distributed a questionnaire to office coworkers that challenged, criticized, and 
called for reform of the office transfer policy). 
 140 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). 
 141 Id. at 568–69 (“The problem in any case is to arrive at the balance between 
the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public 
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees.”). 
 142 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004) (per curiam). 
 143 See id. at 82–84. 
 144 Id. at 81. 
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ultimately apply because the officer was clearly leveraging his po-
sition as a police officer and because his expression did not qualify 
as a matter of public concern.145 On the other side of the coin is 
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union.146 There, the 
Court refused to trigger the balancing test to evaluate a ban on fed-
eral employees receiving honoraria for outside writing and speeches 
because, like other former federal workers-cum-writers Nathaniel 
Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and Walt Whitman,147 these plaintiffs 
expressed their views on matters of public concern in their capacities 
“as citizens, not as Government employees.”148 The evidence of this 
was considerable: the expression had nothing to do with their jobs, 
they did not address their writing to other government employees, 
and their speech had no impact on the workplace.149 In these cases, 
the geographic origins of the speech made little difference. What 
mattered was the relational nexus between the speaker and her au-
dience and between the speaker and the workplace. 
3. APPLYING THE RELATIONAL NEXUS 
A smattering of lower courts have applied a relational, rather 
than a geographic, test for determining whether Tinker applied to 
student speech. In Thomas v. Board of Education, for example, stu-
dents who created an independent magazine modeled after the “Na-
tional Lampoon” could not be punished for its sexual content not 
                                                                                                             
 145 Id. at 84. See also id. at 83 (“Connick held that a public employee’s speech 
is entitled to Pickering balancing only when the employee speaks ‘as a citizen 
upon matters of public concern’ rather than ‘as an employee upon matters only of 
personal interest.’” (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983))). 
 146 513 U.S. 454 (1995). 
 147 Hawthorne, author of The Scarlet Letter, and Melville, author of Moby 
Dick, worked for the United States Customs Office. Whitman, the transcenden-
talist poet and author of Leaves of Grass, worked for the Department of Justice 
and the Department of the Interior. See EDWIN HAVILAND MILLER, SALEM IS MY 
DWELLING PLACE: A LIFE OF NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE 169 (Iowa City 1st ed. 
1991); Steven Olsen Smith, Introduction to MELVILLE IN HIS OWN TIME: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE OF HIS LIFE, DRAWN FROM RECOLLECTIONS, 
INTERVIEWS, AND MEMOIRS BY FAMILY, FRIENDS, AND ASSOCIATES xviii (Steven 
Olsen Smith, ed. 2015); GAY WILSON ALLEN, THE SOLITARY SINGER: A CRITICAL 
BIOGRAPHY OF WALT WHITMAN 319–20, 322, 408 (1967). 
 148 Nat’l Treasury Emp.’s Union, 513 U.S. at 465–66. 
 149 Id. at 465. 
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because the magazine was created off campus,150 but because the 
students “deliberately designed” their work to have no connection 
to the school, their education, or their peers.151 As such, they were 
not acting qua students and this was a non-student speech case.152 
They were humorists and political activists, identities not connected 
to the youth’s membership in the school community.153 
However, students were acting qua students when their other-
wise off-campus speech targeted specific members of the school 
community. In Wisniewski v. Board of Education, a student’s off-
campus creation and narrow distribution of an icon that depicted the 
murder of a teacher triggered Tinker because the graphic, which 
would not have been created but for the student’s connection to the 
school, had the potential to affect the educational environment.154 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court came to a similar decision in J.S. 
v. Bethlehem Area School District,  in which a student created a vul-
gar and derogatory website on his teacher.155 The website, which 
depicted the teacher’s head dripping with blood, morphing into 
Adolph Hitler, and soliciting funds to pay for a hit man,156 was never 
distributed inside the geographic boundaries of the school, but it had 
a significant effect on its target.157 The teacher took a leave of ab-
sence and suffered physical and emotional harm, not to mention hu-
miliation and loss of respect.158 Tinker was triggered not by physical 
presence, but by the content and effects of the website and its crea-
tor’s and target’s connection to the school.159 
A relational nexus should also be applied in cyberbullying cases. 
Peer-to-peer cyberbullying cases that involve an aggressor targeting 
                                                                                                             
 150 Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 151 Id. at 1050. Admittedly, some activity related to the magazine did take 
place at school; however, the court found that such activity was de minimis. Id. 
 152 See id; See also Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 964, 975 
(5th Cir. 1972) (where students similarly authored a newspaper during after-
school hours and without using any materials or facilities related to the school 
system). 
 153 See Thomas, 607 F.2d at 1045. 
 154 494 F.3d 34, 36, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 155 J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850–51 (Pa. 2002). 
 156 Id. at 851. 
 157 Id. at 852. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 865. 
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a victim he or she knows from school would not exist but for their 
connection to the school. As the court noted in J.S., “the web site 
was aimed not at a random audience, but at the specific audience of 
students and others connected with this particular School Dis-
trict.”160 If a student reaches into the school community and attacks 
a victim he knows only through school, then he is acting as a mem-
ber of the school community.161 Tinker applies.162 More generally, 
the lesson from the Supreme Court’s quartet of student speech cases 
and, by analogy, its public employee speech cases, is that Tinker can 
be triggered by student speech that is related to the speaker’s con-
textual connection to the school—when he is acting as a student qua 
student. Most student-to-student cyberbullying, particularly where 
the aggressor and victim attend the same school, will qualify. This 
stands in contrast to adolescents who engage in dissident speech that 
has nothing to do with the school environment or students who may 
cyberharass someone they know (or have never met) in an entirely 
different context. 
Consider a few hypotheticals. Jill is a sophomore. After a few 
weeks attending the local public high school, she grows close to 
Jack, a junior, with whom she has one class and lunch. During their 
three-month relationship, Jill consents to Jack taking several inti-
mate photos of her. After their breakup, Jack posts these photos to 
his blog163 along with derogatory, misogynistic, and hateful com-
ments. He considers them funny jokes and commentary on “how 
difficult women can be.”164 He also taunts Jill on Twitter and sends 
her text messages that alternate between criticizing her character and 
                                                                                                             
 160 Id. at 865. 
 161 See id. 
 162 See id. at 867–68. 
 163 For now, I put to one side Jack’s liability as a perpetrator of nonconsensual 
pornography or cyberexploitation, or the posting on the Internet of graphic or in-
timate images of another without their consent. As of January, 2017, thirty-four 
states and the District of Columbia had criminal nonconsensual pornography laws 
and California, under Attorney General Kamala Harris, has been aggressively pur-
suing those who violate their victims in this way. See Danielle Keats Citron & 
Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 
368 (2014). This essay is exclusively focused on a school’s disciplinary authority 
over student-to-student cyberbullying. 
 164 Though altered, the fact pattern is based on a real case on which the author 
has consulted. Names have been changed to protect the privacy of all individuals 
involved. Consent was obtained from the victim to include her story in this essay. 
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appearance and begging for her to take him back. Some of Jack’s 
friends join in on the behavior, and Jill notices that many people will 
no longer talk to her at school and appear to be whispering behind 
her back. There is, however, no evidence that any image or harassing 
behavior made it onto school grounds. It would be difficult to sub-
ject Jack to Tinker’s substantial disruption standard under a campus 
presence requirement. Posting images, commenting on them, and 
attacking Jill on Twitter and through text messages all took place off 
campus. Yet there is no doubt that Jack was acting in his capacity as 
a member of the school both he and Jill attend. He met her through 
school and his behavior after they parted was both reasonably likely 
to—and actually did—have an effect on Jill and the educational en-
vironment in the school. 
At the other end of the spectrum are cases where the aggressor, 
victim, and harassment have no relational nexus to the school, i.e., 
where they are not acting qua student. Sasha and Samantha, for ex-
ample, are 15 and 17 years old respectively, and are teammates on a 
county-run soccer team. When they are not playing soccer, they at-
tend public schools in neighboring districts. After losing out to Sa-
mantha in a competitive tryout for goalie, Sasha creates a fake         
Facebook profile of Samantha and posts critical comments and un-
flattering or doctored photos. She also trolls Samantha on Twitter 
using a pseudonymous handle. Sasha would be violating Facebook’s 
Terms of Service, which prohibit impersonation and fake profiles.165 
Depending on the types of comments she made on Twitter, Sasha 
might also run afoul of Twitter’s anti-harassment policies.166 But it 
is hard to see how either Samantha’s or Sasha’s school could get 
involved, absent a stronger connection between the young women 
and their school communities. 
As always, the tougher cases are in the middle. Behavior that is 
multicontextual, i.e., in part based on the aggressor’s and victim’s 
connections to the school environment and in part related to outside 
connections, can still trigger Tinker because the behavior at least 
somewhat arises from students acting qua students and members of 
                                                                                                             
 165 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/commu-
nitystandards# (last visited Jan. 27, 2017). 
 166 The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/18311 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2017). 
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the same school.167 And attenuated connections may break the link: 
a student who cyberbullies a fellow student’s friend he or she met at 
a house party may not fall under Tinker’s sweep if the connection 
was truly divorced from the school context. The central point is this: 
the fulcrum upon which to judge Tinker’s applicability to student 
cyberspeech is the student’s capacity as a student acting qua student 
and his connection to the school environment and educational mis-
sion.168 In most student-to-student cyberbullying cases involving 
students of the same school, that requirement would be satisfied. It 
would not be met when students exercise their rights to contribute 
to the marketplace of ideas through satire, critique, and public com-
ment. 
IV. A COMPELLING INTEREST 
So far I have argued that Tinker’s substantial disruption standard 
for evaluating student speech can be applied even when the speech 
originated and took place off campus. A physical presence require-
ment is meaningless in the Internet age. And, in any event, the Court 
never actually stated that student speech must be within the school’s 
physical boundaries to come under Tinker’s umbrella.169 Rather, the 
Court’s language in Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, not to 
mention its public employee speech cases, suggests that the test for 
applying the substantial disruption standard is a relational one, based 
on the speaker’s connection to the school environment and his be-
havior as student qua student.170 Applying that test would permit 
greater school disciplinary authority over cyberbullies. And despite 
the fact that school administrators have not always perfectly de-
ployed that authority,171 more flexibility to move against cyberbul-
lying would, on balance, be a good thing for several reasons. 
                                                                                                             
 167 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
513 (1969). 
 168 See generally id. 
 169 See generally id. 
 170 See supra Section C and accompanying notes. 
 171 This is particularly true in the LGBT context. See, e.g., Elahe Izadi, A Flor-
ida School Board Just Blocked Transgender Kids from Choosing Bathrooms, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/educa-
tion/wp/2016/04/27/a-florida-school-board-just-blocked-transgender-kids-from-
choosing-bathrooms/; Meghan Dwyer, Outrage After Transgender Student Told 
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First, cyberbullying can devastate its victims, most of whom are 
members of marginalized groups. In her definitive account of cyber-
harassment and its effects, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace, Danielle 
Keats Citron notes that victims experience mood swings, anxiety, 
depression, panic attacks, fear of social interactions, post-traumatic 
stress disorder,172 and a panoply of other injuries.173 Cyberharass-
ment victims also report increases in alcohol and substance abuse.174 
Student victims of cyberbullying withdraw from school activities 
and both face-to-face and online social interaction.175 To adults, 
these effects are serious enough, but to adolescents, they can be dev-
astating.176 Cyberharassment has been linked to lower educational 
achievement and diminished professional success.177 Adolescent 
                                                                                                             
He Can’t Run for Prom King: ‘We Stand with Him 100%’”, FOX6NOW.COM (Apr. 
6, 2016, 9:00 PM), http://fox6now.com/2016/04/06/transgender-student-told-he-
cant-run-for-prom-king/; Kamaria Roberts, Chicago School District Discrimi-
nated Against Transgender Student, Report Says, PBS (Nov. 4, 2015, 5:34 PM), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/chicago-school-district-discriminated-
transgender-student-report-says/. 
 172 CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 16, at 10–12. See also 
Adrienne Nishina & Jaana Juvonen, Daily Reports of Witnessing and Experienc-
ing Peer Harassment in Middle School, 76 CHILD DEV. 435, 444 (2005) (measur-
ing anxiety, humiliation, school dislike, and anger as negative effects of peer har-
assment); Michele L. Ybarra et al., Examining Characteristics and Associated 
Distress Related to Internet Harassment: Findings From the Second Youth Inter-
net Survey, 118 PEDIATRICS 1169, 1172 (2006) (reporting that 38% of youth were 
distressed by a single incident of harassment); Michele L. Ybarra, Linkages be-
tween Depressive Symptomatology and Internet Harassment among Young Reg-
ular Internet Users, 7 CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 247, 252 (2004) (discussing 
depressive symptomatology as “significantly related to the report of online har-
assment”). 
 173 See Ybarra, Linkages, supra note 172, at 249. 
 174 Id. at 248. 
 175 NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS: RESPONDING 
TO THE CHALLENGE OF ONLINE SOCIAL AGGRESSION, THREATS, AND DISTRESS 47 
(2007). 
 176 See Waldman, Tormented, supra note 13, at 399. 
 177 Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 70, 73 
(2009) [hereinafter Citron, Cyber Civil Rights]. 
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anxiety contributes to poor socialization, long term depression, and 
marginalization.178 The list goes on.179 
When adolescent victims of cyberharassment are members of a 
traditionally marginalized group like women and the LGBT com-
munity, the effects may be even worse.180 Women and young girls 
are uniquely targeted online.181 Over an 11-year period, they consti-
                                                                                                             
 178 See id. at 69–71; see also CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra 
note 16, at 11. 
 179 See, e.g., Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178–79 (9th 
Cir. 2006) (“Speech that attacks high school students who are members of minor-
ity groups that have historically been oppressed, subjected to verbal and physical 
abuse, and made to feel inferior, serves to injure and intimidate them, as well as 
to damage their sense of security and interfere with their opportunity to learn. The 
demeaning of young gay and lesbian students in a school environment is detri-
mental not only to their psychological health and well-being, but also to their ed-
ucational development. Indeed, studies demonstrate that ‘academic underachieve-
ment, truancy, and dropout are prevalent among homosexual youth and are the 
probable consequences of violence and verbal and physical abuse at school.’ One 
study has found that among teenage victims of anti-gay discrimination, 75% ex-
perienced a decline in academic performance, 39% had truancy problems and 
28% dropped out of school. Another study confirmed that gay students had diffi-
culty concentrating in school and feared for their safety as a result of peer harass-
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drop out altogether. Indeed, gay teens suffer a school dropout rate over three times 
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success in life.”) (internal citations omitted). See also MICHAEL BOCHENEK & A. 
WIDNEY BROWN, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS: VIOLENCE AND DISCRIMINATION 
AGAINST LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER STUDENTS IN U.S. 
SCHOOLS 49 (Human Rights Watch, 2001); Kelli Kristine Armstrong, The Silent 
Minority Within a Minority: Focusing on the Needs of Gay Youth in our Public 
Schools, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 67, 76–77 (1994) (describing how abuse 
by peers causes gay youth to experience social isolation and drop out of school); 
Maurice R. Dyson & Nicolyn Harris, Safe Rules or Gays’ Schools? The Dilemma 
of Sexual Orientation Segregation in Public Education, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 
187 (2004) (gay teens “face greater risks of . . . dropping out [and] performing 
poorly in school”); Amy Lovell, “Other Students Always Used to Say, ‘Look at 
the Dykes’”: Protecting Students from Peer Sexual Orientation Harassment, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 617, 625–28 (1998) (summarizing the negative effects on gay stu-
dents of peer sexual orientation harassment). 
 180 Citron, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 16, at 11. 
 181 See id. at 13–14. 
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tuted at least 72% of cyberharassment victims and 60% of cyber-
stalking victims.182 They are 90% of revenge porn victims.183 Inter-
net chat users with female names receive, on average, 100 harassing 
messages for every four received by users with male names.184 That 
is twenty-five times more hate directed at women than men. They 
are routinely attacked, reduced to sexual objects, shamed, and 
threatened, merely for being women.185 These effects may be even 
worse for LGBT individuals for several reasons. Because LGBT and 
questioning youth often rely on online social networks to replace 
non-existent face-to-face communities,186 cyberharassment threat-
ens to cut off their only outlet in which they can be themselves. As 
early as 2001, more than 85% percent of LGB adolescents reported 
that the Internet had been the most “important resource for them to 
connect with LGB peers.”187 Destruction of that online social sup-
port network through cyberharassment is, therefore, particularly 
harmful because it turns what might have been a gay student’s safe 
space into a danger zone. Furthermore, institutional discrimination 
faced by LGBT individuals metastasizes the psychological effects 
of cyberharassment because, as Mark Hatzenbuehler has shown, in-
                                                                                                             
 182 Id. at 13. 
 183 Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, Inc., Revenge Porn Statistics, END REVENGE 
PORN (2014), http://www.endrevengeporn.org/main_2013/wp-content/uploads/
2014/12/RPStatistics.pdf. 
 184 Citron, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 16, at 14. 
 185 See id. at 14. 
 186 See Edward Stein, Queers Anonymous: Lesbians, Gay Men, Free Speech, 
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 187 Vincent M.B. Silenzio, et al., Connecting the Invisible Dots: Reaching Les-
bian, Gay, and Bisexual Adolescents and Young Adults at Risk for Suicide 
Through Online Social Networks, 69 SOC. SCI. MED. 469, 469 (2009) (citing 
Lynne Hillier et al., AUSTL. RESEARCH CTR. IN SEX, HEALTH, AND SOC’Y, ‘IT’S 
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YOUNG PEOPLE (2001), available at https://www.latrobe.edu.au/arcshs/down-
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stitutional discrimination enhances all mood, anxiety, and psycho-
logical disorders.188 In a 2010 study, Hatzenbuehler found that insti-
tutional discrimination can have a statistically significant negative 
effect on the mental health of LGB persons: lesbians, gay men, and 
bisexual individuals who lived in states that banned gay couples 
from marrying experienced mood, anxiety, and psychiatric disorders 
at higher rates than LGB persons living in equality states.189 It makes 
sense, then, that LGBT victims of bullying and harassment rival 
only homeless LGBT youth in the frequency and severity of psy-
chological injury in the community.190 Schools have an interest in 
protecting their most vulnerable students from having their lives de-
railed by cyberharassment.191 
Second, and as these statistics suggest, cyberbullying is often a 
gendered and sexualized phenomenon that amounts to discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex.192 Whether victims are attacked for being 
gay, bisexual, or transgender, for gender nonconformity, or for be-
ing a woman in a man’s world, cyberharassment tends to take on the 
characteristics of an identity-based attack.193 This piles on its own 
                                                                                                             
 188 Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., The Impact of Institutional Discrimination 
on Psychiatric Disorders in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: A Prospec-
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 192 See CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 16, at 13 (“Cyber 
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 193 See id. at 16. 
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horrors. It conveys a message of worthlessness, stigmatizing an en-
tire group of people as second class.194 This in turn encourages oth-
ers to join in the aggression and instills a sense of self-hatred within 
victims.195 It also makes cyberbullying anathematic to an effective 
educational environment: when victims feel attacked and treated 
like second class citizens, they are less likely to participate in class 
and succeed.196 
Third, far from protecting speech, tolerating cyberbullying si-
lences speech.197 Victims retreat from online life, excluding valu-
able perspectives from public discourse.198 We know, for example, 
that one of the most common refrains victims of cyberbullying and 
cyberharassment hear is to turn off their computers, leave Facebook, 
or stop checking Twitter.199 As a response to the problem, that rec-
ommendation is offensive: it puts the onus on the victim to rescue 
herself and absolves the perpetrator of any real punishment.200 As 
Citron has argued, preventing online harassment and allowing those 
                                                                                                             
 194 See Ari Ezra Waldman, All Those Like You: Identity-Aggression and Stu-
dent Speech, 77 MO. L. REV. 653, 670 (2012) [hereinafter Waldman, All Those 
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the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 86 (1994); Richard Delgado, 
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 197 See Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, supra note 177, at 97–98. 
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 199 See generally End to Cyber Bullying Organization, Cyberbullying Preven-
tion for Teens, END CYBERBULLYING.ORG, http://www.endcyberbullying.org/
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 200 See id. (“Why should a victim be required to interrupt an online experience 
because of someone else’s maliciousness? It is not appropriate to blame the victim 
for another’s aggressive actions. No one should have to turn off his or her com-
puter due to harassment received online, just like no one should avoid going to 
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460 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:428 
 
who would otherwise be bullied into silence to contribute to the mar-
ketplace of ideas would “advance the reasons why we protect speech 
in the first place.”201 Otherwise, adolescent victims in school will 
stop contributing to school society; many will move to escape their 
harassers even though a new address is not safe from a cyberhar-
asser.202 
When a school considers punishing one of its students for cyber-
bullying another, these are the values at stake: the school’s commit-
ment to educating its students, ensuring equality, and preventing the 
marginalization of minority groups. These values are simply not at 
issue when students engage in “higher value” speech that does not 
target, defame, and harass. Therefore, schools have a compelling in-
terest to take steps to eradicate cyberbullying, wherever it takes 
place, because of the significant damage it can do to the school’s 
ability to teach all its students. 
CONCLUSION 
That cyberbullies harass their victims outside the physical 
boundaries of a school does not immunize them from school disci-
pline.203 The First Amendment is not blind to changes wrought by 
Internet technologies. Nor has the Supreme Court ever held that 
Tinker can only be triggered by on-campus speech.204 But punish-
ment can only get us so far. Although this essay is limited to arguing 
for a relational trigger for Tinker, it does not suggest that greater 
discipline can eradicate cyberbullying on its own. Schools need to 
take affirmative steps to improve school climate, address the root 
causes of bullying and cyberbullying, and teach full acceptance of 
marginalized groups. Disciplining cyberbullies can help establish 
norms that recognize cyberharassment as anathematic to freedom, 
autonomy, and equality. That is undoubtedly part of a school’s edu-
cational mission. 
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